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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Michael Scott Molen appeals from his judgment of conviction for lewd conduct 
with a minor under the age of sixteen. Mr. Molen was convicted following a jury trial and 
the district court imposed a unified sentence of twenty years, with eight years fixed. 
Mr. Molen now appeals, and he asserts that 1) the district court erred by failing to give 
a unanimity instruction; 2) the district court erred by excluding evidence of the alleged 
victim's sexual knowledge and behavior; 3) his right to due process was violated by the 
use of his silence to have the jury infer guilt; and 4) the district court abused its 
discretion by failing to strike an allegation of criminal activity from the Presentence 
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI). 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In the summer of 2004, then-eight-year-old S.Z. came to Idaho to visit her 
grandmother and step-grandfather, Connie and Michael Scott Molen. (Tr., p.275, Ls.1-
11.) S.Z testified that one day during the summer, she walked into Mr. Molen's room 
and he was wearing his underwear. (Tr., p.281, Ls.16-18.) According to S.Z., 
Mr. Molen removed her clothes, pushed her onto the bed, and began "humping" her. 
(Tr., p.282, Ls.3-6.) She testified that his "private part" went inside her "private part." 
(Tr., p.283, Ls.22-24.) According to S.Z., Mr. Molen told her not to tell anybody or else 
he would be in a lot of trouble. (Tr., p.285, Ls.10-12.) She also testified that on several 
other occasions he would touch her on her stomach and her legs and that he kissed her 
when they were in the kitchen. (Tr., p.286, L.2 - p.291, L.12.) 
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S.Z. did not tell anybody about the alleged abuse until the summer of 2005, when 
she returned to visit her grandparents. She testified that she told her cousins and her 
friend Heather about the abuse. (Tr., p.293, Ls.8-15.) 
On cross-examination, S.Z. testified that "sex stuff" happened three times the first 
summer and "one or two times" the second summer. (Tr., p.331, L.21 - p.332, L.5.) 
When confronted with her previous testimony, S.Z. stated that in June, 2005, "he didn't 
really do it in the living room, but he did for sure do it in the bedroom." (Tr., p.341, Ls.2-
11.) She stated that one time, they "both had their underwear on" but he was "still doing 
that." (Tr., p.342, Ls.24-25.) She specifically stated that on other occasions "privates 
touched without any clothes on." (Tr., p.343, Ls.17-20.) She also specifically stated 
that she thought intercourse happened four to five times; she had previously stated in 
the preliminary hearing that it happened twelve times. (Tr., p.340, Ls.6-7.) 
Alisa Ortega, who performs physical examinations for the CARES program at 
St. Luke's testified that "healed tears" in S.Z.'s hymen indicated that "at some point in 
this child's life something has gone through that hymen big enough to tear it" and that 
this finding "could" indicate sexual abuse. (Tr., p.471, L.3 - p.472, L.14.) Mr. Molen's 
expert, Dr. Friedlander, testified that he had no qualms with the way the examination 
was conducted, but that he found no evidence of blunt force trauma and it would be 
"extremely hard to believe" that penetration had occurred. (Tr., p.695, Ls.1-6.) 
Daniel Holt testified that, during a camping trip, Mr. Molen told him that he was 
thinking of accepting a plea that was offered by the State; according to Mr. Holt, once 
Mr. Molen found out that he had told others this information, Mr. Molen threatened him. 
(Tr., p.514, Ls.2-4; 520, Ls.20-23.) 
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Mr. Molen testified. He testified that he never engaged in a conversation with 
Mr. Holt regarding a plea offer, and, in fact, never considered a plea offer because he 
was innocent. (Tr., p.595, Ls.5-18.) He stated that he never had a good relationship 
with Mr. Holt and would not seek his advice. (Tr., p.595, Ls.22-24.) He testified that he 
never touched S.Z. inappropriately. (Tr., p.635, L.24 - p.635, L.18.) He stated that in 
2005 he and Ms. Molen decided it was time to send S.Z. home because she tried 
French-kissing them. (Tr., p.637, Ls.1-7.) 
Mr. Molen also testified that Ms. Davidson, S.Z.'s mother, hated him because he 
had kicked her and her boyfriend out of their house for failing to follow the rules. 
(Tr., p.606, Ls.8-25.) Mr. and Ms. Molen had also discussed seeking custody of S.Z.; 
they had been concerned about Ms. Davidson's boyfriend and had had to call Child 
Protection Services several times. (Tr., p.610, L.24 - -p.611, L.17, p.725, Ls.21-25.) 
Ms. Molen once found a hypodermic needle in S.Z.'s bedroom and Mr. Molen called the 
Drug Enforcement Agency. (Tr., p.723, L23 - p.724, L.8.) Ms. Davidson's sister Mandy 
Smith-Davidson even testified that Ms. Davidson "tried to tell me to testify that 
[Mr. Molen] molested me at 13 years old;" this allegation is not true. (Tr., p.754, Ls.10-
13.) 
Mr. Molen was charged with one count of lewd conduct with a minor under the 
age of sixteen. (R., p.283.) Although the jury heard evidence of multiple acts of alleged 
criminal conduct, the Amended Information contained only one charge, and that alleged 
that "on or about the 1st day of June, 2004, through the 30th day of July, 2004, and/or 
the 1st Day of June, 2005, through the 20th day of June, 2005," Mr. Molen committed 
lewd conduct by having genital-to-genital contact with S.Z. (R., p.283.) He was 
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convicted following a jury trial and the district court imposed a unified sentence of 
twenty years, with eight years fixed. (R., p.605.) Mr. Molen appealed, and he asserts 
that the district court erred by failing to give a unanimity instruction, that the district court 
erred by excluding evidence of S.Z.'s sexual knowledge and behavior, that his right to 
due process was violated by the State's use of his silence to infer guilt, and that the 
district court abused its discretion by failing to strike an unsubstantiated allegation of 
criminal behavior from Mr. Molen's PSI. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court denying Mr. Molen's statutory and constitutional rights to a 
unanimous jury by failing to give a unanimity instruction? 
2. Did the district court err by excluding evidence of S.Z.'s sexual knowledge? 
3. Was Mr. Molen's right to due process violated when the State used his silence to 
infer guilt? 
4. Did the district court err by failing to strike an allegation from the Presentence 
Investigation Report? 




The District Court Denied Mr. Molen His Constitutional And Statutory Rights To A 
Unanimous Jury Verdict When It Failed To Give The Jury A Unanimity Instruction 
A. Introduction 
The district court instructed the jury that Mr. Molen could be found guilty of lewd 
conduct if jurors determined that he committed the crime in either 2004 or 2005 and the 
jury heard evidence of several acts of alleged criminal conduct. Despite the jurors 
hearing about separate incidents of criminal conduct upon which they could find guilt on 
the criminal charge, the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it must unanimously 
agree on the specific incident constituting the offense. In failing to give the obligatory 
unanimity instruction, the district court denied Mr. Molen's constitutional and statutory 
rights to a unanimous verdict, thereby committing both reversible and fundamental 
error. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Failed To Give The Jury A Unanimity Instruction 
1. The District Court Committed Reversible Error When It Failed To Give The 
Jury A Unanimity Instruction 
A crime is made up of factual elements "which are ordinarily listed in the statute 
that defines the crime." Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 (1999). In 
contrast, "brute facts make up a particular element, say, which of several possible 
means the defendant used to commit an element of the crime." Id. 
Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a unanimous jury verdict, "a 
jury in a federal criminal case cannot convict unless it unanimously finds that the 
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Government has proved each element." Id. In contrast to the unanimity requirement for 
a crime's elements, "a federal jury need not always decide unanimously which of 
several possible sets of underlying brute facts make up a particular element . . . . " Id. 
(citing Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 631-632 (1991) (plurality opinion)). Thus, under 
the Sixth Amendment, a jury rnust be unanimous in finding the elements of a crime, but 
it does not have to be unanimous as to which brute facts constitute those elements. 
In Idaho, the jury verdict must be unanimous in all felony criminal cases. State v. 
Johnson 145 Idaho 970, 977, 188 P.3d 912, 919 (2008). See also I.C. §§ 19-2316, 19-
2317; I. C.R. 31. The Idaho Constitution provides that in a felony criminal trial a jury's 
verdict must be unanimous. See IDAHO CONST. art. I § 7. Although section seven does 
not specifically state that felony trials require a unanimous verdict, that conclusion is 
inescapable from the provision's language. "The right of a trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate; but in civil actions, three-fourths of the jury may render a verdict, and the 
legislature may provide that in all cases of misdemeanors five-sixths of the jury may 
render a verdict." Id. 
In order to preserve the right to a unanimous jury verdict, a unanimity instruction 
must be given "when it appears that there is a genuine possibility of jury confusion or 
that a conviction may occur as the result of different jurors concluding that the 
defendant committed different acts." State v. Gain, 140 Idaho 170, 172, 90 P.3d 920, 
922 (Ct. App. 2004). 
Where the evidence indicates that separate and distinct incidents of 
criminal conduct could provide a basis for a juror's finding of guilt on the 
criminal charge in any count, the trial court must instruct the jury that it 
must unanimously agree on the specific incident constituting the offense in 
each count .... 
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Id. at 172-73, 90 P.3d at 922-23. "A unanimity instruction is used to tell the jury that 
they must find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on a single agreed 
upon incident, thus ensuring the defendant has a unanimous jury verdict." State .v 
Montoya, 140 Idaho 160, 167, 90 P.3d 910, 918 (2004). 
A separate incident requiring a unanimity instruction has been defined as "a 
distinct union of mens rea and actus reus separated by a discrete period of time and 
circumstance from any other such similar incident." Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 268, 
16 P.3d 937, 944 (Ct. App. 2000). 
Although the jury heard evidence of multiple acts of alleged criminal conduct, the 
Amended Information contained only one charge, and that alleged that "on or about the 
1st day of June, 2004, through the 30th day of July, 2004, and/or the 1st Day of June, 
2005, through the 20th day of June, 2005," Mr. Molen committed lewd conduct by having 
genital-to-genital contact with S.Z. (R., p.283.) In the present case, Mr. Molen could be 
convicted of acts occurring in either 2004 or 2005 and the jury heard evidence of 
multiple acts of alleged criminal misconduct. Because separate and distinct incidents of 
criminal conduct in this case could provide a basis for the jurors' finding of guilt, the trial 
court erred when it failed to instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree on the 
specific incident constituting the offense in each count. In this case, some of the jurors 
may have found that Mr. Molen committed the alleged act in 2004 and some of the 
jurors may have found that Mr. Molen committed the alleged act in 2005. This is not the 
unanimous jury verdict contemplated by the Idaho Constitution, LC.§§ 19-2316 and 19-
2317 and Idaho Criminal Rule 31. See Montoya, 140 Idaho at 167, 90 P.3d at 918 
(requiring a finding of the "defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on a 
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single agreed upon incident .... "); Gain, 140 Idaho at 173, 90 P.3d at 923 (requiring 
the jury to unanimously agree "on the specific incident constituting the offense in each 
count."), Mifler, 135 Idaho at 268, 16 P.3d at 944 (holding that defendant was entitled to 
an instruction requiring that the jury find him guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of a 
single agreed upon incident). 
Further, this is not a case where the jury could decide that different "brute facts" 
constituted an element of the offense - this is a case where the jury heard evidence of 
several completely separate acts; while the State focused on one act in particular, the 
jury heard evidence from S.Z. that she had originally alleged that sex occurred 
approximately twelve times, and she reduced that number to "four or five" at the trial. 
Further, she testified that there were times that "privates touched" when their clothes 
were on, and the jury was instructed that it was not necessary that skin be touched; 
touching could occur through the clothing. (Jury Instruction 12.) 
Because it is impossible to tell whether the jury correctly reached its verdict 
unanimously, or incorrectly reached its verdict based upon different jurors finding that 
Mr. Molen committed different acts, this Court must vacate the conviction and remand 
the case for a new trial. See State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 294, 301, 1 P.3d 795, 802 
(2000). 
2. Because A Unanimity Instruction Is An Obligatory Instruction On A Rule Of 
Law Material To The Determination Of The Defendant's Guilt Or 
Innocence. Mr. Molen Can Raise This Issue For The First Time On Appeal 
Admittedly, counsel for Mr. Molen did not request a unanimity instruction. 
However, because a unanimity instruction is an obligatory instruction on a rule of law 
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material to the determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence, Mr. Molen can raise 
this issue for the first time on appeal. 
In State v. Patterson, 60 Idaho 67, 88 P.2d 493 (1939), the Idaho Supreme Court 
recognized that there were two distinct types of jury instructions in Idaho. 
Undoubtedly, it was the intention of the legislature in enacting sec. [19-
21321] to charge the judge with the duty of instructing the jurors on what 
he believes to be the "matters of law necessary for their information, and 
to permit counsel to request instructions on particular points which they 
have reason to believe will not be covered unless request therefore be 
made. 
Id. at , 88 P.2d at 497. 
Thus, in a criminal case, the district court has a duty to instruct the jury on "'all 
matters of law necessary for their information."' Miller, 135 Idaho at 267, 16 P.3d at 943 
(quoting LC.§ 19-2132 and State v. Mack, 132 Idaho 480,483,974 P.2d 1109, 1112 
(Ct. App. 1999)). This includes instructions on "rules of law material to the 
determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence." Id. (citing Mack, 132 Idaho at 483, 
974 P.2d at 1112). "Such obligatory instructions include those necessary to correctly 
inform the jury with respect to the nature and elements of the crime charged and the 
essential legal principles applicable to the evidence that has been admitted." Id. (citing 
State v. Beason, 95 Idaho 267, 275, 506 P.2d 1340, 1348 (1973), and State v. 
Patterson, 60 Idaho 67, 75-76, 88 P.2d 493, 496 (1939)). 
However, if a defendant desires further instructions on a given point beyond the 
obligatory instructions, he must request that instruction or the issue is waived. Beason, 
1 Although the opinion cites to LC. § 19-2032, this statute was later redesignated as 
LC.§ 19-2132. See historical notes LC.§ 19-2132. In addition, the relevant language 
cited by the court is now contained in I.C. § 19-2132. 
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95 Idaho at 275, 506 P.2d at 1349; see also I.C.R. 30{b) (stating that no party may 
assign as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction unless the party objects 
thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict .... "). 
In the case at bar, the district court erred when it failed to give the jury a 
unanimity instruction which required the jury to be unanimous as to whether Mr. Molen 
committed the alleged act in 2004 or 2005. In Idaho, a unanimity instruction must be 
given regardless of whether the defendant requests such an instruction because it is an 
instruction on a rule of law material to the determination of the defendant's guilt or 
innocence. Miller, 135 Idaho at 267, 16 P.3d at 944; I.C. § 19-2132. 
3. The District Court Committed Fundamental Error When It Failed To Give 
The Unanimity Instruction 
Even if this Court were to find that the question of whether the district court erred 
when it failed to give an obligatory instruction cannot be raised for the first time on 
appeal, this Court can still review this error as it is a fundamental error. 
a. A Claim Of Fundamental Error In Regards To The District Court's 
Failure To Given A Necessary Jury Instruction Can Be Raised For 
The First Time On Appeal 
An error generally is not reviewable if raised for the first time on appeal. State v. 
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 277, 77 P.3d 956, 966 (2003). Moreover, Idaho Criminal Rule 
30(b) provides that "[nJo party may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an 
instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, 
stating distinctly the instruction to which the party objects and the grounds of the 
objection." 
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However, Idaho courts have traditionally reviewed "fundamental" errors on 
appeal, even when no objection was raised at trial. State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 
486 P.2d 260 (1971). An error is fundamental when it "so profoundly distorts the trial 
that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his fundamental right to 
due process." State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recently ruled that, despite Idaho Criminal Rule 
30(b), a challenge may be made to jury instructions so long as the error is 
"fundamental." State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 748, 170 P.3d 886, 892 (2007). In 
Anderson, the court stated: 
Since the district court committed error, it must be determined whether 
Idaho appellate courts may review fundamental errors in jury instructions 
even when no objection was made at trial. It may be argued that 
permitting review of fundamental errors would defeat the purpose of Rule 
30(b) because it would allow review of jury instruction errors even when 
no objection was made. It should be noted, though, that permitting Idaho's 
appellate courts to review fundamental errors in jury instructions does not 
render Idaho Criminal Rule 30(b) a nullity, as Rule 30(b) would still forbid 
review of any error not so egregious that it produced manifest injustice by 
violating the defendant's due process rights under the federal or Idaho 
constitutions. Presumably, since most jury instruction errors do not double 
as manifestly unjust due process violations, Idaho Criminal Rule 30(b) 
would apply in most cases in which no timely objection followed a trial 
court's error. Our holding therefore has not reduced Criminal Rule 30(b) to 
a nullity. 
Because the jury instruction may be subject to limited review for due 
process violations that resulted in manifest injustice, the issue then turns 
to whether such a fundamental error occurred. Again, a fundamental error 
is a due process violation that produced manifest injustice. State v. Lavy, 
121 Idaho 842,844,828 P.2d 871,873 (1992). 
Id. Because Mr. Molen is making a claim of fundamental error, this Court may review 
the error. 
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b. The District Court's Error In Failing To Give The Requisite 
Unanimity Instruction Was A Fundamental Error 
"The task of safeguarding the rights of criminal defendants ultimately rests with 
the experienced men and women who preside in our district courts." United States v. 
Balough, 820 F.2d 1485, 1491 (9th Cir. 1987) (J., Kozinski, concurring). A district 
court's responsibility does not end when he rules on objections and motions raised by 
the parties. This is recognized by the doctrine of fundamental error, which embodies 
the notion that there are some errors that are so prejudicial and obvious that the 
appellate court must remedy them even without an objection. The Idaho Appellate 
Courts may consider fundamental error in a criminal case, even where no objection was 
made at trial. See Sheahan, 39 Idaho at 277, 77 P.3d at 966. Fundamental error has 
been defined as error which goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights, 
goes to the foundation of the case or takes from the defendant a right which was 
essential to his or her defense and which no court could or ought to permit to be waived. 
State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 940, 877 P.2d 905, 911 (1994). 
In the present case, the rights Mr. Molen lost are his constitutional and statutory 
rights to a unanimous verdict. The right to a unanimous jury verdict in a felony criminal 
trial is so fundamental to the citizens of Idaho that it has been expressed in both the 
constitution and in statutes. See IDAHO CONST. art. I, §7, I.C. §§ 19-2316, 19-2317 and 
Idaho Criminal Rule 31. This fundamental right is essential to every defense in Idaho 
and no court could or ought to permit it to be forfeited in the absence of a knowing and 
voluntary waiver from the defendant. See U.S. v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) 
(recognizing that "Waiver is different from forfeiture. Whereas forfeiture is the failure to 
make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the 'intentional relinquishment or 
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abandonment of a known right'" (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). 
Because the right to a unanimous verdict is fundamental to every felony case in the 
state of Idaho, the failure to give a unanimity instruction to preserve this right constitutes 
fundamental error. 
c. The Error Was Not Harmless 
Even when a fundamental error has occurred, this Court will not reverse a 
conviction if the fundamental error was harmless. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 165 
P.3d 273 (2007); see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 144 
L.Ed.2d 35 (holding that a jury instruction that omits an element of an offense is subject 
to harmless error review). But, "before a federal constitutional error can be held 
harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, 87 S. Ct. 824, 828, 17 
L.Ed.2d 705, 710 (1967). Fundamental error is a federal constitutional error, since, as 
discussed, its definition entails a due process violation. See State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 
842, 844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992). In deciding whether the error was harmless, the 
Chapman Court held that "[t]he question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that 
the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction." Chapman, 386 
U.S. at 23, 87 S.Ct. at 827, 17 L.Ed.2d at 710. That possibility certainly exists in this 
case. 
The jury heard evidence that S.Z. had accused Mr. Molen of multiple acts. The 
Information specifically alleged that the event happened in either 2004 and/or 2005. 
Thus, the individual jurors could have found that Mr. Molen had committed separate 
criminal acts. Because it is possible that the jury did not unanimously agree upon a 
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single incident of criminal misconduct, the error is not harmless and Mr. Molen's 
conviction must be vacated and his case remanded. 
IL 
The District Court Denied Mr. Molen's Sixth And Fourteenth Amendment Rights To 
Cross-Examination And His Fourteenth Amendment Right To Due Process By Not 
Allowing Questioning Concerning The Alleged Victim's Exposure To Sexual Acts 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Molen asserts that the district court denied his right to cross-examination 
protected by the Sixth Amendment and his right to due process protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by denying him the right to 
present evidence that the victim's sexual knowledge did not come from the alleged 
incident. Further, he asserts that his preferred evidence was relevant. 
B. The District Court Denied Mr. Molen's Sixth And Fourteenth Amendment Rights 
To Cross-Examination And His Fourteenth Amendment Right To Due Process By 
Not Allowing Questioning Concerning The Alleged Victim's Exposure To Sexual 
Acts 
Prior to the trial, counsel for Mr. Molen filed in a motion in limine seeking to admit 
"evidence of the alleged victim's past exposure to adult sexual matters through the 
sexually explicit lifestyle, conduct, materials and words of her mother and her mother's 
friends pursuant to IRE Rules 401 and 402." (R., p.285.) Specifically, counsel argued 
the following: 
One of the most pressing questions the jury will ask itself is how this eight 
year old girl would know so much about sex unless she had actually been 
molested. The defense will produce several witnesses, including the 
sisters and mother of the Tiffany Davidson, the alleged victim's mother, 
who will testify that Tiffany Davison has exposed her daughter, [S.Z.] to a 
constant, graphic, sexually charged lifestyle for her entire life, including 
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openly having sex with multiple partners with [S.Z.] in the home, openly 
discussing and showing sex toys and pornography in front of [S.Z.], and 
openly disrobing in front of other family members in the presence of [S.Z.], 
etc. This evidence is not only relevant under IRE Rule 401 and 402, it is 
crucial to the jury's understanding of the accuser's knowledge of sexual 
matters and how she obtained it. Without it, the jury will make 
assumptions that are in no way based in reality. 
(R., pp.289-90.) Further, Mr. Molen wished to present evidence of the alleged victim's 
"sexualized behavior" pursuant to I.RE. 412. (R., p.290.) Mr. Molen argued, 
The Defense will produce witnesses, including S.Z.'s sisters, grandmother, 
and the Defendant, to testify that, prior to the alleged conduct, [S.Z.] 
exhibited some sexualized behaviors that were highly inappropriate in a 
young girl. These including attempting to "French kiss" her grandparents, 
attempting to watch her grandparents having sex, stating that she had 
watched her mother having oral sex and intercourse, and attempting to 
pull family members' pants down. . . . This evidence is important because 
[S.Z.] accuses the Defendant of attempting to "French kiss" her, and she 
denies trying to do the same. The gestures and words she uses indicated 
that she felt this kissing was something foreign to her. Yet, according to 
her family members, it was something she attempted several times with 
them, before she was allegedly molested. She exhibited highly sexualized 
conduct, words and knowledge, before she was allegedly molested, and 
the jury must hear this evidence to avoid unfair prejudice to the Defendant. 
(R., pp.290-91.) Mr. Molen offered the following Offer of Proof in support of his motion: 
that Connie Molen, Scott Molen, Connie's sister Diane, Nicole Holt, and Mandi 
Davidson would testify that S.Z. attempted to "French kiss" her grandparents, attempted 
to watch her grandparents having sex, attempted to pull down the pants of her 
grandparents, knew about "oral sex," "like doggies do it," and wanted "a tattoo on [her] 
pooty" like her mother has. (R., pp.293-94.) 
At the hearing, the State characterized the evidence as "prior bad acts of the 
mother of the victim. That's essentially what they're trying to get in, is the fact that 
allegedly the mother of the victim has exposed her daughter to some type of sex or 
over-sexualized conduct. Your Honor, that is completely irrelevant, how an eight-year-
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old girl knows about sex." (Tr., p.38, Ls.17-24.) The district court excluded the bulk of 
the proferred evidence, stating: 
Now, as to the child's exposure, I struggled a little bit with the rule that 
talks about the victim's sexual behavior. And, frankly, observing someone 
else I don't think is sexual behavior within the meaning of the rule. And 
I'm still not sure about whether French kissing constitutes sexual behavior. 
But I'm a little puzzled by the defendant's premise that if the child knows 
the words, "French kissing" or knows the word "ejaculations," that she 
could have only - that one would logically draw a conclusion that she 
learned that from being molested. 
So I'm not going to allow testimony about this child's life history of 
exposure to sexual conduct. I will allow, however, depending on what 
comes in with the CARES interview and that sort of thing, evidence about 
her knowledge of the question of French kissing. Because that seems to 
me to be clearly relevant, and I'm not sure that that would be precluded by 
the rule on the victim's prior sexual history. And that would include 
evidence of this child having engaged in that sort of thing in the past. 
But based on what I know about this case, the fact that this child saw her 
mother having intercourse in more than one fashion or whatever is not 
relevant to the facts of this case. 
(Tr., p.51, L.12-p.52, L.19.) 
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution reads as follows: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the assistance of counsel for his defense. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (emphasis added). The right to compulsory process is 
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Washington v. Texas, 388 
U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967). The United States Supreme Court has held that, "[t]he right to 
offer testimony of witnesses ... is in plain terms the right to present a defense[.]" Id. at 
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19. The Supreme Court further held in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), 
that: 
The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, 
the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's .accusations. 
The rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses 
in one's own behalf have long been recognized as essential to due 
process. 
Id. at 294. In State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 81 P.3d 1230 (2003), the Idaho Supreme 
Court recognized that a defendant's right to present evidence is fundamental, but 
subject to reasonable limitations. Id. at 523, 81 P.3d at 1233 (citations omitted). The 
Court further recognized that the exclusion of evidence is unconstitutional when it 
infringes upon a weighty interest of the defendant. Id. (citation omitted). 
Additionally, "The right to confront witnesses, guaranteed by the sixth and 
fourteenth amendments, includes the right to cross-examine witnesses to attack their 
general credibility or to show their possible bias or self-interest in testifying." Hughes v. 
Raines, 641 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 1981). The main purpose of the confrontation 
clause is to afford the opponent the opportunity of cross examining the witness. 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974). "Cross-examination is the principal means 
by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested." Id. 
One of the many purposes of cross-examination is to reveal possible ulterior motives, 
prejudices, or biases the witness may have, and thereby discredit the witness' 
testimony. Id. "We have recognized that the exposure of a witness' motivation in 
testifying is proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-
examination." Id. 
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our 
jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action seriously 
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injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on 
fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government's case must be 
disclosed to the individual so that he has the opportunity to show that it is 
untrue. While this is important in the case of documentary evidence, it is 
even more important where the evidence consists of the testimony of 
individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be 
perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, 
prejudice, or jealousy. We have formalized these protections in the 
requirements of confrontation and cross examination. Greene v. McElroy, 
360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959). 
In Davis, supra, petitioner's counsel wanted to show the jury, through 
questioning, that at the same time the State's witness was assisting the police in 
identifying petitioner, he was on probation for burglary. 415 U.S. at 311. From this, the 
petitioner wanted to show, or at least argue, that the witness' motive for identifying the 
petitioner was possible jeopardy of his probation. Id. The court stated that the purpose 
for revealing the witness' juvenile record was "to probe (the witness) for bias and 
prejudice and not generally to call (his) good character into question." Id. Similarly, in 
this case Mr. Molen wanted to question the victim not to call her general character into 
question, but rather, to reveal the source of her information regarding sexual matters. 
The State, and the district court, were incorrect in their belief that the evidence 
was not relevant. All relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise provided by the 
Idaho Rules of Evidence or other rules applicable to the courts of Idaho. I.RE. 402. 
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence." I.RE. 401. Because the question of whether evidence 
is relevant is an issue of law, appellate courts exercise free review of a district court's 
relevancy determination. State v. McAbee, 130 Idaho 517, 518, 943 P.2d 1237, 1238 
(Ct. App. 1997). There is evidence that the alleged victim was exposed to sexually 
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explicit material. Mr. Molen's proferred evidence is necessary to counter the inference 
that because the victim in this case was a child of tender years, and spoke in detail 
about sexual conduct, it was likely that she acquired her knowledge from the alleged 
sexual assault. 
If an accused raises the defense of fabrication, and if the minor victim is of 
such tender years that a jury might infer that the only way the victim could 
testify in detail about the alleged molestation is because the defendant 
had in fact sexually abused the victim, then evidence of the victim's prior 
sexual history is relevant to rebut such an inference. Exclusion of this 
evidence would unfairly curtail a defendant's ability to present a logical 
explanation for a victim's testimony. 
State v. Oliver, 760 P.2d 1071, 1077 (Ariz. 1988). 
In Oliver, the Arizona Supreme Court found that the trial court was correct in 
allowing the defendant, Oliver, "to inform the jury that Jackie had independent 
knowledge of sexual matters; particularly, the trial court believed it was important that 
the jury understood that, prior to the alleged molestation, Jackie had knowledge of 
seminal fluids and ejaculation." Id. at 29. Jackie was nine years old at the time of the 
alleged incident. Id. at 25. In contrast, the Supreme Court did not allow the defendant 
in State v. Cordone (consolidated with State v. Oliver), to introduce evidence of the 
victims' prior sexual history because at the time of the trial the victims were sixteen and 
fifteen years old respectively, and "the testimony of both victims was not particularly 
explicit." Id. at 31. "At its most graphic, the testimony of the victims merely indicated 
that Cordone had placed his mouth on their penises." Id. 
If jurors are not able to see possible alternative explanations for a child's sexual 
knowledge, apart from the alleged incident, they will undoubtedly assume that his or her 
knowledge did in fact come from the alleged incident. Summit v. State, 697 P.2d 1374, 
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1377 (Nev. 1985). In cases where the victim is a child, the lack of sexual experience 
may lead the jury to infer that the victim "was so na"ive sexually that she could not have 
fabricated the charge." State v. Jacques, 558 A.2d 706 (Me. 1989). Therefore, a 
defendant must be allowed to introduce evidence demonstrating a counter explanation 
for the victim's sexual knowledge. Id. In State v. Howard, 426 A.2d 457 (N.H. 1981) the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court stated: 
We believe that the average juror would perceive the average twelve-year-
old girl as a sexual innocent. Therefore, it is probable that jurors would 
believe that the sexual experience she describes must have occurred in 
connection with the incident being prosecuted; otherwise, she could not 
have described it. However, if statutory rape victims have had other 
sexual experiences, it would be possible for them to provide detailed, 
realistic testimony concerning an incident that may never have happened. 
To preclude a defendant from presenting such evidence to the jury, if it is 
otherwise admissible, would be obvious error. 
Id. at 462. 
Before admitting evidence of a victim's sexual knowledge, a two-prong analysis 
must be applied to determine whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs the 
prejudicial effect that it may have. Oliver, 760 P.2d. at 28. 
Under the first prong the defendant must show, in camera, that the victim 
previously had been exposed to a sexual act. Under the second prong, 
the defendant must establish that the prior sexual act was sufficiently 
similar to the present sexual act to give the victim the experience and 
ability to contrive or imagine the molestation charge. 
Id. "There are some cases in which the reputation of the prosecutrix and in which 
specific prior sexual activity may become relevant and its probative value outweigh[s) 
the detrimental impact of its introduction." State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260, 1263-64 
(Utah 1980). 
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In this case, just as in the Howard, the average juror would perceive S.Z. as a 
sexual innocent. The case law set forth above clearly shows that in sexual abuse cases 
involving children, the source of a child's sexual knowledge is extremely relevant. The 
defendant must have the opportunity to show possible alternative explanations for the 
child's ability to describe sexual events. If the defendant is not afforded this opportunity, 
the jury will assume the events took place, and will not be able to render a fair and 
impartial verdict. Thus, Mr. Molen asserts that the trial court erred in not allowing him to 
introduce evidence that would show a counter explanation to the victim's sexual 
knowledge, and respectfully asks that his case be reversed and remanded. 
Even, assuming arguendo that the district court was correct in its pretrial ruling, 
the district court nevertheless erred by refusing to modify its order after Tiffany 
Davidson testified. During direct examination, Ms. Davidson was asked "did you ever 
talk to [S.Z.] in detail about sex and how she might talk about that if she were to talk to 
the authorities in this case?" (Tr., p.393, Ls.6-8.) Her answer was, "no." (Tr., p.393, 
L.9.) On cross examination, Ms. Davidson stated, "I haven't talked to her about sex 
even still," and when asked, "[s]o [S.Z.] had no way of knowing about sex prior to these 
allegations arising?" she responded, "no." (Tr., p.404, Ls.11-15.) Mr. Molen asserts 
that, by asking Ms. Davidson if she had ever discussed sex in detail with S.Z., the State 
opened the door to S.Z.'s exposure to sex. Further, because she specifically denied 
that she had ever discussed sex with S.Z., Ms. Davidson, the district court erred by not 
permitting her to be impeached with the proferred evidence. Instead, the district court 
(a different judge than the one who handled the motion in limine hearing) found the 
evidence "tangentially relevant, but that "whatever probative value it may have is 
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substantially outweighed by the danger of confusion of issues, misleading the jury, and 
unfair prejudice." (Tr., p.411, Ls.6-20.) 
Based on the authorities cited above, the probative value is not outweighed by 
confusion of issues, misleading the jury, and unfair prejudice. In fact, the opposite is 
true; the source of a child's sexual knowledge is extremely relevant. The defendant 
must have the opportunity to show possible alternative explanations for the child's ability 
to describe sexual events. The district court erred by refusing to modify the ruling on 
the motion in limine. 
111. 
Mr. Molen's Due Process Rights Were Violated When The State, On Cross-
Examination, Questioned Why He Had Failed To Previously Testify To His Version Of 
Events 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Molen asserts that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated 
when the prosecutor questioned why Mr. Molen had failed speak to the authorities and 
had waited until trial to tell his version of events. 
B. Mr. Molen's Due Process Rights Were Violated When The State, On Cross-
Examination, Questioned Why He Had Failed To Previously Testify To His 
Version Of Events 
Mr. Molen asserts that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to the United 
State's Constitution, as well as Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, were violated 
when the prosecutor questioned why he had not previously testified to his version of the 
events in question. 
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Pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United State's 
Constitution, as well as Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, no person shall be 
compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself. During direct 
examination, the following exchange occurred: 
Q. When these charges came to light, were you approached by anyone 
from law enforcement? 
A. I still, to this day, have not been approached by anyone from law 
enforcement. 
Q. No one ever asked you what happened? 
A. Nobody has asked me one thing about what has happened. 
Q. Was there an appointment made, to the best of your knowledge? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you try to make that appointment? 
A. I was at my home for two and a half weeks waiting for them to come in 
and beat me up, whatever they do, arrest me, whatever they do or at 
least come and do something about this. 
(Tr., p.614, L.13 - p.615, L.20.) Mr. Molen then stated that he wished the 
authorities had searched his house because he wanted to give them every 
opportunity to see that he was innocent. (Tr., p.616, Ls.23-25.) Once the 
charges were filed, Mr. Molen was advised not to talk to the police. (Tr., p.617, 
Ls.2-9.) During cross-examination, the following exchange occurred: 
Q. Mr. Molen, you testified that you wanted to talk to the police, but 
nobody called you; is that correct? Yes or no? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And you listened to the testimony of Tammy Kennedy on Tuesday, 
didn't you? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. You heard her say that she called you, and you're saying that didn't 
happen? 
A. I was at my home for two weeks waiting for that call. 
Q. Okay. So you sat at home for two weeks waiting for Tammy Kennedy 
to call you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If you wanted to talk to the police so bad, why didn't you call them? 
A. I was scared. 
Q. You were scared? Okay. But you know how to call the police, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You could have easily called up Tammy Kennedy or any other officer 
asking to tell your side of the story, couldn't you? 
A. It was not my job. 
Q. Yes-or-no answer, Mr. Molen. 
A. You bet I could have called them. Sure. 
Q. But you didn't. You waited until you got your chance here to listen to 
all the witnesses and then tell your story, correct? 
A. Yes. 
(Tr., p.672, L.7 - p.673, L.14.) While the State may have properly impeached 
Mr. Molen regarding the issue of whether a call was made to his residence, by 
commenting on his failure to affirmatively seek out the police, and making a 
tactical decision to not talk to the police and wait until trial to tell his story, the 
State improperly used Mr. Molen's silence to ask the jury to infer his guilt. 
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1. The Use Of Mr. Molen's Silence In Asking The Jury To Infer His Guilt 
Violated Mr. Molen's Right To Silence And Due Process Of Law 
The United States Supreme Court held in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), 
"that the use for impeachment purposes of petitioner's silence, at the time of arrest and 
after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." In Doyle, the actions of the prosecutor in cross-examining the defendants 
as to the reason they had not given their version of events at the time of their arrests 
were actions that violated the defendants' rights. Id. at 613-614, n.5. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "[i]f a prosecutor is allowed to introduce 
evidence of silence, for any purpose, then the right to remain silent guaranteed in 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) becomes so 
diluted as to be rendered worthless." State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 714-715, 551 P.2d 
1344, 1350-1351 (1976). The Court went on to find, "[i]t is clearly erroneous to allow 
evidence of post-arrest silence at trial for the purpose of raising an inference of guilt." 
Id. at 715, 551 P.2d at 1351 (citation omitted). 
In Mr. Molen's case, the prosecutor raised an inference of guilt through his cross-
examination of Mr. Molen regarding his failure to call the police and his tactical decision 
to wait until trial to tell his side of the story. Clearly, the prosecutor was attempting to 
convince the jury that Mr. Molen was guilty because if he was innocent, he would have 
contacted the police and would not have waited until trial to tell his story. 
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2. The Violation Of Mr. Molen's Rights Constituted Fundamental Error And 
Therefore. It Was Not Necessary For Mr. Molen To Have Objected To The 
Prosecutor's Actions At Trial In Order To Preserve The Issue For Appeal 
No objections were made against the prosecution's use of the above questions 
and statements at trial. However, Idaho Courts have consistently held that Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment violations, similar to the violations raised by Mr. Molen, are 
subject to a fundamental error analysis. In State v. Poland, 116 Idaho 34, 773 P.2d 651 
(Ct. App. 1989), the Idaho Court of Appeals held that: 
[A] failure to interpose an adequate objection to an alleged error at trial will 
not bar appellate review in a criminal case if the alleged error constitutes 
fundamental error .... Fundamental error is ·an error which so profoundly 
distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the 
accused of his constitutional right to due process.' 
Id. at 36, 773 P.2d at 653 (citations omitted). 
The present case is similar to the fact situation in Poland. In Poland, the Court of 
Appeals found that the prosecutor improperly sought to use the defendant's 
post-Miranda silence to raise an inference of guilt through the testimony of the 
prosecutor's investigator regarding his interview with the defendant and the defendant's 
invocation of the right to remain silent. Id. at 36-37, 773 P.2d at 653-654. While 
Mr. Molen's situation differs in that the questions were specifically directed at his failure 
to call the police and to wait until trial to tell his side of the story the prosecutor was 
clearly commenting on Mr. Molen's silence. Therefore, like the situation in Poland, the 
prosecutor's attempt to use Mr. Molen's silence as an indication of guilt, violated 
Mr. Molen's due process rights and is subject to a fundamental error analysis. 
Likewise, the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed similar issues in State v. Strouse, 
133 Idaho 709, 992 P.2d 158 (1999), under a fundamental error analysis. The issues 
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raised in Strouse are similar to the issues raised by Mr. Molen in that Strouse claimed 
that the prosecutor's cross-examination of the defendant and final argument to the jury 
violated his due process rights. Id. at 711-713, 992 P.2d at 160-162. In Strouse, the 
Court found the evidence regarding the defendant's post-Miranda silence was 
inadmissible and, after finding the error was not harmless, vacated the conviction and 
remanded the case for new trial. Id. at 714. 992 P.2d at 163. 
Mr. Molen asserts that the prosecutor's use of his silence violated his 
Constitutional rights to silence and due process of law and constituted fundamental 
error. However, Mr. Molen recognizes that the Court's analysis does not end with a 
determination of a violation of his constitutional rights. The Court must then determine 
whether or not the error was harmless. 
3. The Prosecutor's Use Of Mr. Molen's Silence To Infer His Guilt Was Not 
Harmless Error 
In Strouse, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that, "[w]hen inadmissible 
evidence has been introduced, the question is whether this Court is 'convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the same result would have been reached had the evidence 
been properly excluded?"' Strouse, 133 Idaho at 714, 992 P.2d at 163 (citation 
omitted). Similarly, in Poland, supra, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated, "[f]or a 
fundamental error to be held harmless, the court must declare a belief, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that such evidence 
complained of contributed to the conviction." Poland at 37, 773 P.2d at 654 (citing 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)). 
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Mr. Molen respectfully asserts that this Court cannot find, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that the prosecutor's attempt to infer 
Mr. Molen's guilt through his cross-examination regarding Mr. Molen's silence did not 
contribute to his conviction. Mr. Molen testified that he not engage in any alleged 
criminal behavior in this case. Further, S.Z. had credibility problems of her own. She 
vacillated on how many times sexual conduct occurred, saying in the preliminary 
hearing that it occurred at least twelve times, to saying that it only happened once at 
trial, and then finally stating that it may have happened approximately four or five times. 
Evidence was even presented that Ms. Davidson had tried to convince another witness 
to testify falsely and accuse Mr. Molen of similar conduct. 
IV. 
Mr. Molen's Case Must Be Remanded For Correction Of The PSI 
In this case, Mr. Molen moved to have an allegation of criminal conduct stricken 
from the PSI. (R., p.593.) In the PSI, the investigator noted that he had called Child 
Protective Services in Utah asking for any information regarding Mr. Molen; they 
reported an allegation of sexual abuse of a minor female, age 5, but, importantly, they 
could not confirm that it involved the defendant because the investigator could find no 
other matching record, and Child Protection Services had no photo, social security 
number or fingerprints associated with this information. (PSI, p.8.) The date of birth 
listed for this defendant, 7/30/60, is not Mr. Molen's birth date. (Cf. PSI, p.8; PSI, p.1.) 
The State did not object; in fact, the prosecutor informed the defense that he had no 
problem with the motion to strike. (Sent. Tr., p.6, Ls.14-20.) While the district court 
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agreed not to consider the allegation, it did not strike the allegation from the PSI. (Sent. 
Tr., p.6, Ls.21-23.) The district court abused its discretion in failing to do so. 
The authority of the district court to correct a PSI was recently discussed by the 
Court of Appeals. See State v. Person, 2007 WL 3171135 (Ct. App. 2007). In Person, 
the court noted: 
the timeframe for alterations to the report is explicitly tied to the sentencing 
hearing; it is at the sentencing hearing-and not beyond-that the defendant 
is given the opportunity to object to its contents. Section (h)(1) of the rule 
further stipulates that '(a]fter use in the sentencing procedure, the 
presentence report shall be sealed by court order, and thereafter cannot 
be opened without a court order authorizing release of the report or parts 
thereof to a specific agency or individual.' Thus, Rule 32 operates to grant 
the defendant a specific time in which to attempt to influence the contents 
of the report and then essentially "closes" the report once the sentencing 
procedure has concluded. Such a restriction is entirely logical from an 
efficiency perspective-to allow a defendant open-ended opportunity to 
argue for alteration of a PSI would result in a disincentive to utilize the 
time explicitly provided for by the rule (at the sentencing hearing) and 
inevitably create an excess of litigation not intended by the procedures 
outlined in Rule 32. Accordingly, we hold that a district court's authority to 
change the contents of a PSI ceases once a judgment of conviction and 
sentence are issued. 
Id. at *2. Thus, under !.C.R. 32, the district court may correct a PSI prior to sentencing. 
Mr. Molen's motion was therefore timely. 
The Court of Appeals has stated: 
During the sentencing hearing the district court verbally articulated which 
portions of the PSI would not be considered because they were deemed 
unreliable. However, we regard the better procedure to be a 'redlining' 
of the report, in which the court physically notes which portions are 
excluded. This procedure not only ensures a clear record for review 
but also protects the defendant against misuse of the unreliable 
information in the future. The use of a PSI does not end with the 
defendant's sentencing. The report goes to the Department of 
Corrections and may be considered by the Commission of Pardons 
and Parole in evaluating the defendant's suitability for parole. See 
I.C.R. 32(h). In addition, if the defendant reoffends, any prior PSI is usually 
presented to the sentencing court with an update report from the 
30 
presentence investigator. Thus, a PSI follows a defendant indefinitely, and 
information inappropriately included therein may prejudice the defendant 
even if the initial sentencing court disregarded such information. 
Accordingly, we recommend that the district court in this case cross 
out on Rodriguez's PSI those portions that were disregarded by the 
court at sentencing and forward a corrected copy to the Department 
of Corrections. 
State v. Rodriguez, 132 Idaho 261, 262 n.1, 971 P.2d 327, 328 n.1 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Conjecture and speculation should in a PSI should not be relied upon. State v. Mauro, 
121 Idaho 178, 824 P.2d 129 (1991). This new allegation is complete conjecture and 
speculation As the Court of Appeals has noted, the use of the PSI does not end with 
sentencing and it may be relevant to a future determination of parole. In the future, the 
Department of Correction could rely on this. Therefore, this case should be remanded 
for correction of the PSI. 
V. 
Under The Doctrine Of Cumulative Error. The Accumulation Of Irregularities During 
Trial. Was Sufficient To Warrant A New Trial 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Molen asserts that under the doctrine of cumulative error, the accumulation 
of errors that occurred during trial in the aggregate, was sufficient to warrant a new trial. 
B. Under The Doctrine Of Cumulative Error. The Accumulation Of Irregularities 
During The Trial. Was Sufficient To Warrant A New Trial 
Mr. Molen asserts that based on the fact that two substantial errors occurred in 
his trial, the doctrine of cumulative error applies to his case, and reversal with a new trial 
is mandated. The argument and authority in support of the assertion that error occurred 
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are set forth in Arguments I, 11, and II of the brief and are incorporated by reference 
herein. 
In State v. Harrison, 136 Idaho 504, 37 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2001 ), the court stated that 
under the doctrine of cumulative error, the, "accumulation of irregularities, each of which 
in itself might be harmless, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial." Id. at 
508, 37 P.3d at 5 (citations omitted). Mr. Molen asserts that the errors which occurred 
throughout his trial were not individually harmless. However, assuming arguendo that 
this Court finds that they were, the accumulation of the errors and irregularities that took 
place negated his right to a fair trial and thus, mandate reversal and a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Molen requests that his conviction for lewd conduct be vacated and his case 
remanded for further proceedings. Additionally, he requests that it be remanded for 
correction of his PSI. 
DATED this 6th day of February, 2009. 
,v,,-,,ve.,RTIS 
ppellate Public Defender 
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